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Measuring the Impact of MiFID II on Information Asymmetries Using Microstructure
Models
Erik-Jan Senn
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen
Abstract
This paper evaluates the impact of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) regulation on information
asymmetries. The microstructure models of Madhavan et al. (1997) and Glosten and Harris (1988) are adapted to estimate
potential changes in the adverse selection component of the spread. I use trade and quote data of 50 German stocks traded
at the Cboe Europe Equities exchange. To classify trades in presence of uncertainly about the sequence of trades and quotes
within a second, a robust classification method is developed. I find a short-term increase in adverse selection and transaction
cost after the MiFID II implementation. A long-term reduction of information asymmetries due to the regulation is indicated
and discussed.
Keywords: Market Microstructure; MiFID II / Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II; Information Asymmetry in Limit
Order Books; Trade Classification; Financial Market Regulation.
1. Introduction
On efficient security markets, all market participants have
the same expectation of the fundamental security value. The
resulting prices immediately incorporate new public informa-
tion because traders revise their beliefs about the fundamen-
tal value. In presence of information asymmetry, informed
traders take advantage of their private information by buy-
ing (selling) securities if their expectation of the fundamental
security value is higher (lower) than the market price. Ra-
tional uninformed traders protect themselves from informed
trading by adjusting their quotes and by revising their beliefs
based on actions of other market participants. This adapta-
tion in trading strategies and behavior typically leads to less
price efficiency and higher transaction costs. These conse-
quences are called adverse selection.
Therefore, regulators such as the European Union seek
to reduce information asymmetries by implementing laws
I greatly appreciate the opportunity to write my thesis at the Chair of
Econometrics, Statistics and Empirical Economics at the University of Tue-
bingen. In particular, I thank my supervisor Joachim Grammig, especially
for his support in choosing an adequate model and estimation method to ad-
dress the research question. I thank Johannes Bleher for his exceptional sup-
port: he collected and provided the data, developed the idea of an extended
tick-rule, gave further suggestions about developing the analysis and assisted
in coding the estimation procedures. Special thanks to Thomas Dimpfl for
providing the idea of a rolling parameter estimation.
and supervising financial markets. The Markets in Finan-
cial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II, 2014) and the asso-
ciated Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR)
came into force on January 3rd, 2018, to replace the previous
framework MiFID I and expand the scope to non-equities.1
2 Improved investor protection, market resilience, efficiency
and transparency for all market participants are the main
goals of MiFID II (see European Securities and Market Au-
thority, 2019). Reducing market fragmentation by limiting
dark pool and Over-the-counter (OTC) trading and homoge-
nizing tick sizes is supposed to increase competition and price
efficiency while driving down transaction cost. Post-trade
transparency is enhanced by extended reporting obligations
for dark pool and OTC trading. The newly applied reporting
standards for non-equities could also reveal relevant infor-
mation for equity markets.3
Whether MiFID II successfully reduces information asym-
metry and therefore adverse selection on equity markets
is evaluated by using two market microstructure models.
1European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2014)
2 From now on, MiFID II and MiFIR will be discussed together under the
name MiFID II.
3 Detailed information on the regulations impacting market transparency
can be obtained from the MiFID II directive (2014) and its supplements or
from the European Securities and Market Authority (2019).
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The Madhavan-Richardson-Roomans model (1997) and the
Glosten-Harris model (1988) state that in addition to new
public information, the observed order flow is informative
and reveals private information about the fundamental value
of a security. While Madhavan et al. (1997) use the surprise
in order flow to measure adverse selection, Glosten and Har-
ris (1988) assume high trade volumes to be informative.
The models are adapted to measure the change in adverse
selection.
The paper is organized as follows. The microstructure
models Section 2 explains the price formation process, the
spread decomposition and the estimation procedures used.
Section 3 describes and analyzes the data used for the ef-
fect estimation and discusses the method of trade classifica-
tion. The model parameter and spread estimates are pre-
sented and discussed in Section 4 while the impact of the
MiFID II implementation on adverse selection is evaluated in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes and proposes further research
ideas.
2. Microstructure Models
2.1. Model Description
Market microstructure models are able to analyze market
frictions such as asymmetric information while accounting
for the basic trading mechanisms. The model proposed by
Roll (1984) shows that without asymmetric information, the
fundamental security value µt fluctuates randomly due to the
uncorrelated newly available public information ut . Trade
indicator models add the concept of informed trading to the
basic framework provided by the Roll model. Since both in-
formed and uninformed traders operate at the market, the
order flow will provide a noisy signal about the fundamental
security value µt . Therefore, market participants also revise
their beliefs about µt depending on the private information
revealed by the order flow.
The trade indicator variable x classifies transactions as
buyer initiated (x = 1), seller initiated (x = −1) or nei-
ther buyer nor seller initiated (x = 0). The Madhavan et al.
(1997) model assumes that surprises in the sequence of trade
indicators x are informative. The revision in beliefs due
to adverse selection depends on the surprise in order flow
x t−E(x t |x t−1) and degree of information asymmetry θ . The
post-trade expected security value µt in Eq. (1) includes both
the revision in beliefs due order flow and new public informa-
tion ut . According to the Glosten and Harris (1988) model,
higher trade volumes vt are associated with informed trades.
This is captured in the adverse selection component zt in Eq.
(2).
Madhavan et al.: µt = µt−1 + θ
 
x t − E(x t |x t−1)

+ ut
(1)
Glosten-Harris: µt = µt−1 + zt x t + ut
(2)
Without informed trading, these processes will reduce to a
random walk with parameters θ and zt equal to zero.
Rational liquidity providers set ask (bid) quotes condi-
tional on the trade being buyer (seller) initiated (see Madha-
van et al., 1997, p.1040). The cost of providing liquidity such
as direct transaction fees, specialist rent, inventory holding
cost and potential profits for market makers are combined
in the transitory component φ (Madhavan et al., 1997) or
ct (Glosten and Harris, 1988). The transitory component is
uncorrelated with the fundamental value and simply added
or subtracted from the conditional post-trade fundamental
value depending on the trade indicator x t (see Eq. (3)/(4)).4
Madhavan et al.: Pt = µt +φx t (3)
Glosten-Harris: Pt = µt + ct x t (4)
Madhavan et al. (1997) include the possibility of trading at
the midquote with unconditional probability P(x t = 0) = λ.
Whereas Glosten and Harris originally assume that trades are
executed at the quoted bid and ask prices, the model frame-
work also applies to trades with x t = 0.
For the unspecified Glosten-Harris model, the transitory
component ct and the adverse selection component zt both
include a constant and a volume-dependent parameter.
Glosten-Harris: ct = c0 + c1vt
zt = z0 + z1vt
Furthermore, for the Madhavan et al. (1997) model deriva-
tion 1 and 2 in the appendix show that the surprise in order
flow can be written using the first-order autocorrelation of
the order flow ρ.
Madhavan et al.: E(x t |x t−1) = ρx t−1 (5)
The post-trade expected value of the security (see Eq.
(1)/(2)) is combined with the transitory component (see Eq.
(3)/(4)) to form the price Pt for both models. To estimate
the model parameters, the price changes ∆Pt are calculated
to remove the unobservable fundamental value µt−1 (see
derivation 3 for Madhavan et al. (1997)).5
Madhavan et al. ∆Pt = (φ + θ )x t − (φ +ρθ )x t−1 + ut
Glosten-Harris ∆Pt = c0∆x t + c1∆(x t vt) + z0 x t
+ z1 x t vt + ut
To model the effect of a change in adverse selection due to
MiFID II, an additional adverse selection component is in-
cluded after the implementation date. The dummy variable
dt is zero prior to January 3
rd, 2018, and one starting from
this date. Therefore, the combined adverse selection param-
eter include the permanent parameter (θ0 or z0,0, z1,0) and
the assumed event effect (θ1 or z0,1, z1,1). If not mentioned,
4 I drop the independent and identically distributed rounding error ξwith
mean zero for simplicity.
5 To be precise, ut here includes the change in the rounding error ∆ξ
instead of ξ as in Eq. (3) and (4).
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all following equations will use θ , z0 and z1 as specified here.
Madhavan et al.: θ = θ0 + θ1dt
Glosten-Harris: z0 = z0,0 + z0,1dt
z1 = z1,0 + z1,1dt
Inserting the additional adverse selection components into
the basic models yields the following price changes for the
extended models:
Madhavan et al. ∆Pt =
 
φ + θ0 + θ1dt

x t− 
φ +ρ(θ0 + θ1dt)

x t−1 + ut
(6)
Glosten-Harris ∆Pt = c0∆x t + c1∆(x t vt)+
(z0,0 + z0,1dt)x t
+ (z1,0 + z1,1dt)x t vt + ut
(7)
The quoted bid-ask spread sQ,t as difference between bid
and ask price is an easily observable a priori measure for po-
tential transaction cost. The model implied quoted spread is
obtained by calculating the implied quotes, which are con-
ditioned on the trade indicator (see Eq. (1),(3) / (2),(4)).
The Glosten-Harris spreads include trade volume vt and are
therefore time-dependent.
Madhavan et al. sQ = 2(θ +φ) (8)
Glosten-Harris sQ,t = 2(ct + zt) (9)
The effective spread sE for a buyer (seller) initiated trade is
defined as twice the difference between the transaction price
(prevailig midquote) and the prevailing midquote (transac-
tion price). It takes into account trading inside the spread
and the effect of large orders going through multiple layers
of the order book. The derivation for the Madhavan et al.
(1997) model spread excluding x = 0 is provided by Theis-
sen and Zehnder (2014). Since trades within the spread are
supposed to execute exactly at the midquote, the effective
spread is zero for x = 0. The resulting expected effective
spreads equal the quoted spreads in Eq. (8) and (9) times
the probability of a trade at the bid or ask.6
Madhavan et al. sE = 2(1−λ)(θ +φ) (10)
Glosten-Harris sE,t = 2(1−λ)(ct + zt) (11)
The realized bid-ask spread sR,t measures the cost of a round-
trip and takes into account the price impact of the first trans-
action.7 Due to the possibility of trading inside the spread,
the realized spreads for both models depend on the trade
indicator in t.8 The computations of the expected realized
6 I denote λ also as the share of trades with x = 0 for the Glosten-Harris
model.
7 Madhavan et al. (1997) call this the effective spread.
8 In their paper, Glosten and Harris (1988) do not allow for trades be-
tween the quotes so the effective spread sR,t = 2ct + zt only depends on the
traded volume.
spreads and the realized spreads conditional on the trade in-
dicator are shown in the appendix (derivation 4 / 5).
Madhavan et al. sR = (1−λ)(2φ + θ ) (12)
Glosten-Harris sR,t = (1−λ)(2ct + zt) (13)
Without the autocorrelation parameter ρ of Madhavan
et al. (1997) model or the volume dependent components c1
and z1 of Glosten and Harris (1988) model, both models are
equivalent to the model proposed by Huang and Stoll (1997)
with a constant adverse selection and a constant transitory
parameter.
2.2. Estimation
For the nonlinear extended Madhavan et al. (1997)
model, the vector of model paramters βMRR = (ρ,λ,φ,θ0,θ1)
is estimated using the generalized method of moments
(GMM). GMM requires exactly identifiable parameters and
an ergodic weakly stationary stochastic process for consistent
parameter estimates, but no additional assumptions about
the underlying data distribution. The main idea of a method
of moments estimator is to choose the estimated parameter
vector βˆMRR so that the sample moments match a defined
set of moment equations. When the number of independent
moment conditions m is equal to the number of estimated
parameters k, the model is exactly identified. The unique
solution of the minimization problem sets the difference of
the sample moments and the moment conditions to zero
given a sufficiently large sample (method of moments). For
over-identified models with m > k, such as the extended
Madhavan et al. (1997) model, one can usually only choose
βˆMRR to closely match sample and population moments.
Hansen (1982) shows that the estimated parameters βˆMRR
are still consistent and asympotically normally distributed.
I use iterated GMM with a Newey-West estimator9 of the
covariance matrix of moment conditions S0 to obtain βˆMRR
and the heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix of
parameters.10
The following 7 moment conditions are used to estimate
the parameter vector βMRR and a constant drift α.
E =

x t x t−1 −ρx t 2|x t | − (1−λ)
ut −α
(ut −α)x t
(ut −α)x t−1
(ut −α)dt x t
(ut −α)dt x t−1
= 0
with ut =∆Pt −
 
φ + θ0 + θ1dt

x t+ 
φ +ρ(θ0 + θ1dt)

x t−1
(14)
9 The chosen number of lags equals the nearest integer of T0.25 with T
as the number of observations (see Greene, 2003, p.142).
10 For a detailed description of the methodology, see Hayashi (2000,
pp.204-214, 454-486).
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The first moment equation defines the first-order autocorre-
lation of the order flow, the second one the probability of
trading inside the spread and the third one the constant price
drift. The last four equations state orthogonality of newly
available public information to the regressors x t , x t−1, dt x t
and dt x t−1.
The Glosten-Harris price change in Eq. (7) is estimated
with ordinary least squares, which can be seen as a solved
case of the method of moments method with the orthog-
onality assumptions as moment conditions. While Glosten
and Harris (1988) state that OLS is not efficient because of
round-off errors and a possibly time-dependent variance of
ut , the estimated coefficients βˆGH will still be consistent and
the white covariance matrix of parameters accounts for het-
eroskedasticity.
The implied model spreads are consistently estimated by
using the estimated model parameters βˆ instead of the true
population parameters β for the quoted spreads in Eq. (8)
and (9). However, due to a potentially different probabil-
ity of trades inside the spread λ before and after MiFID II,
the effective and realized spreads are calculated per observa-
tion instead of using Eq. (10), (11), (12) and (13). For the
Glosten-Harris model, this additionally removes the bias of
possibly correlated trade indicators and volumes.
3. Data
3.1. Source and Selection
The data was scraped from by PhD candidate Johannes
Bleher from the chair of Econometrics, Statistics and Em-
pirical Economics at the University of Tuebingen. The web-
site netfonds.no of the Norwegian Netfonds bank AS (2018)
gives users access to trading on Scandinavian, US and Eu-
ropean exchanges. The stocks in the sample are traded via
the Cboe European Equities exchange 11, which is the largest
European stock exchange with 23.14% market share for DAX
stocks (see Cboe European Equities, 2019a, market statistics
by index). The BXE and CXE integrated books are anony-
mous central limit order books with both displayed and hid-
den liquidity for European equities. The main allowed order
types for integrated books are as follows: displayed and non-
displayed limit orders, displayed and non-displayed market
orders within the order price collar (1% of the European
Best Bid and Offer12), iceberg orders, displayed and non-
displayed pegged orders using the Primary Best Bid and Of-
fer13, displayed and non-displayed post only orders for mar-
ket making and sweep orders that access both the BXE and
the CXE integrated order book (see Cboe European Equi-
ties, 2019b, pp.23-26). Continuous trading is possible from
9:00am to 5:30pm (CET) with an opening and a closing auc-
tion. Apart from the integrated order books, Cboe European
11 BATS Europe Exchange was rebranded to Cboe European Equities in
2017.
12 The European Best Bid and Offer is the best price available in European
central limit order books of regulated markets.
13 Xetra quotes for German equities.
Equities provides a periodic auction book and a seperate dark
book for non-displayed orders (see Cboe European Equities,
2019b, pp.5-6).
The original sample contains separated integrated order
book and transaction data on 203 German equities from Oc-
tober 2017 to March 2018. Securities with less than 5000
observations from December 2017 to January 2018 were re-
moved. Since higher impacts of the aggregation methods in
Section 3.2 on actively traded assets might bias the results,
the 10 most liquid assets of the sample were also excluded.
Therefore, the sample contains 50 stocks with 5000 to 52000
transactions from December 2017 to January 2018. To com-
pare short- and midterm effects, model estimation is done for
a two months time frame14 (December to January) and a six
months time frame (October to March).
SAS On Demand for Academics 9.4 and SAS University
Edition 9.4 (basic edition) were used for data processing,
model estimation and test implementation.
3.2. Trade Classification and Aggregation
The widely used method for inference of trade direction
proposed by Lee and Ready (1991) requires the price Pt , the
best bid P bt and the best ask P
a
t at transaction time t. A trade
is classified as a buy (sell) if the transaction price Pt is higher
(lower) than the midquote. If the transaction price is equal
to the midquote, the tick test classifies the trade by tracing
back to the price change: if it was an uptick (downtick), the
trade is classified as a buy (sell).
Since the time variable t is only measured in seconds
for the position and the trade data, time stamps with mul-
tiple quote changes do not allow to determine the prevail-
ing quotes at the transaction time. Due to large changes in
quotes within a second, using the average bid and ask quotes
per second would reduce the accuracy of trade identification.
Therefore, an alternative method is employed based on the
highest observed bid quote P b,maxt and the lowest observed
ask quote Pa,mint during a second. A trade is classified as a
buy if P b,maxt is smaller than and P
a,min
t is equal to or smaller
than Pt . A trade is classified as sell if P
b,max
t is equal to or
greater than and Pa,mint is greater than Pt . The remaining
trades are classified as trades neither buyer nor seller initi-
ated with x = 0. This method should classify most buys and
sells with ordinary order types correctly. Observations that
could be a buy or a sell according to the displayed quotes are
uncertain and therefore signed as neither buyer nor seller ini-
tiated.15
For multiple transaction within a second, the occurrence
order is uncertain. As large trades are split up into multiple
observations if they go through multiple layers of the order
book, the trade volume v and the first-order serial correlation
14 The time frame contains 20 trading days before and 22 after the imple-
mentation of MiFID II.
15 This method of trade classification was proposed by PhD candidate
Johannes Bleher from the chair of Econometrics, Statistics and Empirical
Economics at the University of Tuebingen.
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of order flow ρ are biased.16 To correct for this, a major-
ity rule determines the trade indicator and aggregates price
and volume to a single trade observation per second.17 This
method leads to unbiased model estimates if all observations
within a second belong to one transaction and the trade indi-
cators are the same. For multiple transactions within the ob-
servations of the same trade indicator, the Madhavan et al.
autocorrelation coefficient ρ and the trade-volume depen-
dent Glosten-Harris coefficients c1 and z1 will be downwards-
biased.
Depending on the number of trades for the security, 55-
80% of the trade observations are impacted by quote aggre-
gation and 5-20% are impacted by trade aggregation. 30-
45% of the trades are classified as inside the spread.
Transactions before and after the official trading hours
from 9:00am to 5:30pm (CET) are deleted. Overnight price
changes are removed because the opening auction price
changes typically do not follow the same distribution as price
changes for continuous trading (see Amihud and Mendelson,
1987).
3.3. Descriptives
Table 1 provides average mean, standard deviation, skew-
ness and excess kurtosis for relevant variables before and af-
ter the implementation of MiFID II. Figures 5 to 16 in the
appendix show the distribution of means across securities as
a histogram and a as time series plot. All variables are pos-
itively skewed with positive excess kurtosis18 except for the
trade indicator.
Prices rose in December and fell slightly in January with
similar standard deviation and decreasing kurtosis for price
P and price change∆P.19 More buys (sells) than sells (buys)
occurred for the period of increasing (decreasing) prices. The
daily distribution for the trade indicator in Figure 10 in the
appendix shows that the share of buys (sells) varied from
about 40% to 60% of the transactions 20. The Madhavan et
al. assumption of E(x) = 0 might not hold for the time frame
because of a possible correlation of the trade indicator and
short term price movements.
Trade volume v and the number of trades per day t r./da y
increased from December to January, which could have vari-
ous reasons such as the inactivity during the Christmas break
16 Trade volume v is underestimated for larger trades. ρ is overestimated
because one transaction splits up into multiple observations with the same
trade indicator x .
17 The volume-weighed trade indicator for all trades within the second
is calculated. For x >= 13 , the aggregated indicator x t is set to 1, for
1
3 >
x > 13 , x t = 0 and for x <= − 13 follows x t = −1. For the aggregated trade
observation per second, the accumulated volume and the volume-weighed
average price of all observations with x t,i = x t is used. If x t = 0 and no
observation fulfills x t,i = x t , then the accumulated volume and the volume-
weighed average price of all observations within the second is used.
18 Excess kurtosis is defined as kurtosis -3. If positive, the distributions
kurtosis is higher than the kurtosis of the normal distribution.
19 The mean price difference cannot be entirely explained by the mean
price change ∆P because overnight price changes are deleted.
20 This is a simplified interpretation of the trade indicator assuming that
all trades are either buys or sells.
in December or new portfolio allocations and strategies in
the new year. However, the distribution of trade volume v is
highly susceptible to data aggregation (see Section 3.2). The
shift in mean trade volume could be caused by a higher num-
ber of trades which increases the probability of aggregating
multiple trades within a second. This might also explain the
positive skewness and kurtosis of trade volume (see Figure
11 in the appendix). The higher number of trades per day
in January could also be caused by increased attractiveness
of the Cboe trading venue. This may indicate a successful
shift of trading volume to more structured market places as
intended by MiFID II.
Quoted spreads decreased by 1.0 cents from December to
January while effective spreads increased marginally. Stan-
dard deviations fell sharply for both measures. The low ratio
of effective to quoted spread is partly caused by trades in-
side the spread. In addition, the fact that best bid and best
ask vary within a second could lead to more sells (buys) at
higher bid (lower ask) quotes while sQ and sE are calculated
using averages. Still, the considerable difference between
quoted and effective spread reduces their validity as observed
measures of transaction cost. The relative spreads rQ,MQ and
rE,MQ compare the spread to the midquote and are used as a
standardized measure for different security prices. The rela-
tive effective spread rE,MQ decreased by 3.2% compared to
the 4.0% increase for the effective spread. This indicates
that absolute effective spreads are not proportional to secu-
rity prices.
The same descriptives for the time frame from October
1st, 2017, to March 31st, 2018 are provided in Table 4 in
the appendix. Price movement, trading activity and spread
changes all have the same directions as for the smaller time
frame. Price volatility increased for the period from January
to March and effective spread volatility is constant compared
to the decrease in Table 1.
From January 2nd to January 3rd, tick sizes increased
for 38 securities of the sample and stayed constant for 12
securities due to the introduction of the MiFID II ticksize
regime21. An increase in minimum tick size generally in-
creases spreads and transaction cost (Verousis et al., 2018).
Boyde et al. (2018) and a paper published by the french fi-
nancial markets regulator Autorite des Marches Financiers
(2018)22 show that the minimum tick size regime of MiFID II
is the main determinant of relative quoted spread changes for
individual securities. Relative quoted spreads for DAX stocks
with an rise in minimum tick size increased by 35.6%, the
overall average increased by 8.9% (see Boyde et al., 2018,
p.6). These findings are not confirmed by the decreasing rel-
ative quoted spreads for the Cboe data. Unequal sample com-
position and trading venues could be one reason for the de-
viant effect. Besides, the discrepancy could be caused by the
21 The minimum tick size for each stock in the sample is determined by
sorting the quotes in ascending order and calculating the smallest difference
between quotes. Taking differences of the minimum tick size on January 3rd
and January 2nd in 2018 yields the change in minimum tick size for a security
assuming no significant change in price or trading activity.
22 Authors unknown.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (Dec. 2017 - Jan. 2018)
Note. This table presents the descriptive statistics for key variables from December 1st, 2017, to January 31st, 2018. The mean, standard deviation, skewness
and excess kurtosis of the individual security distributions are reported before and after the implementation of MiFID II. The following variables are included:
price P in Euro, price change between trades ∆P in cent, trade indicator x , quoted/effective spread sQ/sE in cent, volume per trade v in 1000 shares,
transactions per day t r./da y , relative quoted/effective spread rQ,MQ/rE,MQ in basis points.
Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Excess kurtosis
before after before after before after before after
P 72.244 75.48 1.465 1.423 0.498 0.195 13.369 1.191
∆P 0.000 -0.008 3.458 3.546 -1.100 -0.498 41.386 37.200
x 0.002 -0.003 0.021 0.022 0.119 0.157 -0.156 -0.121
v 11.590 12.254 21.194 27.601 1.424 1.415 3.556 5.553
t r./da y 502.595 580.671 135.412 136.625 0.347 0.831 0.636 4.903
sQ 8.070 7.004 7.759 5.979 3.118 3.557 25.446 18.368
sE 1.346 1.400 4.472 3.036 2.374 2.334 32.443 24.310
rQ,MQ 12.060 9.620 11.646 5.091 3.145 3.557 25.654 18.436
rE,MQ 1.955 1.893 7.076 2.525 2.504 2.320 33.376 25.054
average quoted spread calculation which is not time-weighed
for the Cboe quotes.
For consistent estimation results, weakly stationarity of
price changes is required. The Dickey-Fuller test rejects the
null hypothesis of non-stationary price changes for all secu-
rities on a 1% significance level.
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Parameter Estimates
Table 2 shows summary statistics of the Madhavan et al.
parameter estimates. Autocorrelation of order flow ρˆ is pos-
itive as assumed by the model. 39.22% of the trades are
classified as neither buyer nor seller initiated. The transi-
tory parameter estimate φˆ with 0.69 cents is more than twice
as large as the estimated adverse selection parameter before
MiFID II θˆ0 with 0.32 cents. The additional adverse selec-
tion parameter in January, θˆ1, is comparable in size to θˆ0,
which leads to a combined adverse selection parameter of
0.62 cents after MiFID II. The drift estimate αˆ is economi-
cally insignificant. Without knowledge of the parameter dis-
tribution, the mean of parameter estimates βˆi is still assumed
to be normally distributed, so a t-test on the mean parame-
ter can be conducted. The p-value for this test shows that
all parameters except the drift α are significantly different
from zero on a 1% level. On an individual level, the share
of significant parameters for two-sided and one-sided tests
supports the overall t-test results. The first-order autocor-
relation parameter ρ, the share of trades inside the spread
λ and the transitory parameter φ are significantly greater
than zero for all stocks on a 5% significance level. For the
adverse selection parameters θ0 and θ1, the null hypothesis
of a parameter value smaller or equal to zero is rejected for
58% and 66% of stocks respectively. After the MiFID II im-
plementation, the combined adverse selection parameter θ
is significantly greater than zero for 47 stocks on a 5% level.
The parameter estimates for the six months estimation
period in Table 7 in the appendix are similar for ρ, λ, θ0
and α. The estimated transitory component φˆ is 0.08 cents
lower and the MiFID II adverse selection component θˆ1 0.16
cents higher for the longer estimation period. The adverse
selection parameters θ0 and θ1 are significantly greater than
zero for 76% and 86% of stocks respectively. The combined
adverse selection parameter after MiFID II is significantly
greater than zero for all stocks.
Compared to the Madhavan et al. (1997) estimates for a
sample of 274 NYSE stocks in 1990, the parameters are no-
tably different in size.23 Higher autocorrelation (0.38), less
trades inside the spread (30%) and substantially higher tran-
sitory (4.18) and adverse selection (3.14) parameters for the
NYSE sample signifies a change in market dynamics and ef-
ficiency from 1990 to 2017. Theissen and Zehnder (2014)
use signed transaction and spread data for DAX stocks traded
at XETRA in 2004 to estimate the Madhavan et al. (1997)
model. Their mean estimated transitory parameter φˆ with
0.48 cents is slightly lower than for the Cboe sample, which
could be explained by lower direct transaction costs for the
highly liquid DAX-stocks. While the on average smaller capi-
talized stocks in the Cboe sample are expected to have higher
adverse selection costs (see Frey and Grammig, 2006), θˆ is
higher for the DAX sample than for the Cboe sample even af-
ter the MiFID II implementation (0.70 cents to 0.62 cents).
The higher DAX autocorrelation of 0.22 combined with the
Madhavan et al. (1997) estimate of 0.38 supports the idea
23 The parameters are reported over 5 intra-day trading intervals. The
mean of parameters is used for comparison with the German sample.
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Table 2: Parameter estimates (Madhavan et al., Dec. 2017 - Jan. 2018)
Note. The table presents summary statistics of the Madhavan et al. model parameters estimates based on data from December 1st, 2017, to January 31st,
2018. The mean of estimated parameters βˆi and the mean of estimated parameter standard deviations σˆβˆi are given with i denoting the individual securities.
The estimated standard deviation of the mean estimated parameter σˆ
βˆi
is used to compute the p-value for the two-sided t-test on βˆi . On a single security
level, the share of significant parameters for two-sided and one-sided tests on a 5% level is provided. The parameter mean and standard deviation for φ, θ0,
θ1 and α are denoted in cent.
all securities single securities - significant βi
βˆi σˆβˆi σˆβˆi
P H0 : βi = 0 βi >= 0 βi <= 0
ρ 0.1087 0.000074 0.0036 <0.01% 100% 0% 100%
λ 0.3922 0.000020 0.0042 <0.01% 100% 0% 100%
φ 0.6910 0.000036 0.0765 <0.01% 100% 0% 100%
θ0 0.3207 0.000111 0.0966 0.17% 68% 12% 58%
θ1 0.3021 0.000154 0.0768 0.03% 74% 10% 66%
α -0.0021 0.000018 0.0048 66.21% 6% 10% 0%
that the trade aggregation process imposes a negative bias
on the autocorrelation parameter ρ for the Cboe sample (see
Section 3.2).
Table 5 in the appendix presents the Glosten-Harris pa-
rameter estimates for the two month time frame. The mean
constant transitory parameter cˆ0 with 0.72 cents is signifi-
cantly different from zero, which is supported by the tests
on a single security level. The mean volume-dependent tran-
sitory parameter cˆ1 per 100 shares is significant according
to the overall t-test, but on the individual level only 40%
of stocks reject the null hypothesis of c1 = 0. For the aver-
age trade volume of 12000 shares (see Table 1), the volume-
dependent component is 0.08 cents, which is marginal com-
pared to the constant transitory component. Nevertheless,
since trade volume is positively skewed, some securities and
observations will have sizable volume-dependent transitory
components.24 The constant transitory parameters z0,0 and
z0,1 are both positive and significant according to the overall
t-test. The test results for single stocks are less clear. Only for
68% of the sample the parameters are significantly different
from zero, 68% of individual parameters for z0,0 and 62% for
z0,1 are significantly greater than zero. The combined con-
stant adverse selection parameter z0 after MiFID II is equal
in size to the constant transitory component and significantly
greater than zero for 96% of the stocks.
The volume-dependent adverse selection parameters
zˆ1,0 and zˆ1,1 are both negative, but zˆ1,1 is statistically and
economically insignificant. For the average trade volume,
the volume-dependent adverse selection component is -0.38
cents which is similar to the base constant adverse selection
parameter zˆ0,0 in absolute value. The combined parameter
24 The upper 5% confidence interval for the daily mean trade volume
in Figure 12 in the appendix is about 45000 shares per transaction, which
would lead to a volume-dependent transitory component of 0.32 cents. A
median volume of about 7000 shares per transaction would lead to a volume-
dependent transitory component of 0.049 cents.
z1 is significantly different from zero for 70% of stocks after
the MiFID II implementation. According to a multiple re-
striction Wald test, the overall adverse selection component
is significantly different from zero for 41 stocks before and
48 stocks after the MiFID II implementation.25
The differences of the Glosten and Harris (1988) esti-
mates for the longer time frame in Table 8 in the appendix
are similar to the differences for the Madhavan et al. (1997)
estimates. The constant transitory parameter cˆ0 and the
base constant adverse selection parameter zˆ0,0 are 0.05 cents
lower, the MiFID II constant adverse selection parameter z0,1
is 0.12 cents higher for the longer estimation period. The
combined volume-dependent adverse selection parameter zˆ1
is closer to zero before and after MiFID II for the longer time
frame, but the additional MiFID II parameter zˆ1,1 is more
relevant. The combined parameter z0 after the MiFID II im-
plementation is significantly greater than zero for all stocks.
The overall adverse selection component is significantly dif-
ferent from zero for 48 stocks before and all stocks after the
MiFID II implementation.
The model specification without c1 and z0 proposed by
Glosten and Harris (1988) is rejected for 41 stocks before
and 48 stocks after the MiFID II implementation using a Wald
test. The size and direction of the volume-dependent adverse
selection component for the German sample do not support
support the hypothesis of higher trade volumes indicating in-
formed trading. Both the Madhavan et al. and the Glosten-
Harris overall model are significant for all stocks.
Comparing the model parameter estimates, the transi-
tory parameters φˆ an cˆ0 are almost equal in size. This is
not surprising since they both measure non-persistent effects
and are incorporated in the models in the same way. The
constant adverse selection parameter before MiFID II θˆ0 is
25 H0 before MiFID II: z0,0 = 0, z1,0 = 0. H0 after MiFID II: z0,0+z0,1 = 0,
z1,0 + z1,1 = 0.
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Table 3: Spread estimates (Madhavan et al., Dec. 2017 - Jan. 2018)
Note. This table presents model-implied estimated Madhavan et al. spreads and spread ratios before and after the implementation of MiFID II from December
1st, 2017, to January 31st, 2018. The mean sˆi / rˆi and the estimator of the variance across the sample σˆsˆi / σˆrˆi are reported in cents for the quoted spread
sQ and the effective spread sE . The shares of implied to observed spread rQ,Data and rE,Data and the share of implied spread attributable to adverse selection
rAdv are denoted in percent. P-values for the paired t-test on difference in means before and after the MiFID II implementation are given in percent.
Mean Std.Dev. Paired t-Test
before after before after P
sQ 2.023 2.627 2.094 2.415 0.03%
rQ,Data 26.482 37.755 11.442 10.555 <0.01%
sE 1.261 1.573 1.278 1.501 0.20%
rE,Data 90.590 110.013 26.719 22.876 <0.01%
rAdv 17.602 41.751 34.734 16.332 <0.01%
smaller than zˆ0,0, which might partly be due to the negative
volume-dependent parameter zˆ1 that has to be compensated.
The assumed MiFID II effect on adverse selection is measured
by θ1, z0,1 and the negligible volume-dependent parameter
z1,1. Constant adverse selection components for both mod-
els are similar in size and significantly positive for two out
of three stocks. For the six months estimation period, the
additional adverse selection parameters are larger and sig-
nificantly positive for five out of six stocks.
4.2. Spread Estimates
The economic implications of the parameter estimates are
assessed by investigating the model implied spreads (see Eq.
(8) to (11)) as measures for transaction cost.
Table 3 presents the Madhavan et al. implied spreads, the
share of implied to observed spread and the share of implied
spread attributable to adverse selection before and after the
application of MiFID II. A paired t-test on difference in means
before and after the implementation date is conducted and
indicates a significant change in means for all variables and
both models. The required normal distribution of differences
plotted in Figures 3 and 4 in the appendix is unlikely to hold
for all variables. Therefore, the significance of the changes
in means according to the paired t-test should be evaluated
with caution.
From December to January, the implied quoted spread sQ
increased from 2.02 cents to 2.63 cents, which is caused by
the positive additional adverse selection parameter θˆ1. The
observed quoted spread is highly underestimated as shown
by the low share of implied to observed quoted spread rQ,Data.
The observed quoted spread decreased after the MiFID II im-
plementation whereas the implied quoted spread increased.
Madhavan et al. (1997) argue that their systematic underes-
timation of the quoted spread by a third might be caused by
a higher probability of midquote transactions when spreads
are large.
The implied effective spread sE is 0.31 cents higher af-
ter the MiFID II implementation while the observed spread
marginally increases by 0.05 cents. Using Eq. (12), the
approximated implied change in realized spread sR from
December to January is 0.18 cents (= (1− λˆ)θˆ1).26 Increas-
ing transaction cost measured by sE and sR is attributed to
a higher adverse selection component of the spread. The
model implied effective spread underestimates the observed
effective spread by 9.6% before and overestimates it by
10.0% after the implementation. In comparison to the 1.26
cents (before MiFID II) or 1.573 cents (after MiFID II), Theis-
sen and Zehnder (2014) report average effective spreads of
2.36 cents for the DAX sample without trades inside the
spread. Furthermore, Theissen and Zehnder (2014) provide
evidence for a 20% downwards bias of implied spreads of
trade indicator models caused by negative serial correlation
of new public information and the trade indicator. This bias
cannot be found for the Cboe sample. Adding the fact of
reasonable parameter estimates for the Cboe sample when
compared to the results of Theissen and Zehnder (2014) sup-
ports the assumption that the aggregated observed effective
spreads are probably inaccurate (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3).
For the six months time frame, the assumed adverse selec-
tion effect is larger with 0.88 cents for sQ and 0.51 cents for
sE compared to the 0.60 cents and 0.31 cents for two months
(see Table 9 in the appendix). The Glosten-Harris spread es-
timates in Tables 6 and 10 in the appendix are comparable
in size for the estimates before and after the MiFID II imple-
mentation.
5. Impact Evaluation
The validity of the measured MiFID II effect on adverse se-
lection depends upon the capability of the chosen microstruc-
ture models to quantify adverse selection, the data quality
and the ability to attribute the effect to the MiFID II changes.
26 This simplified calculation of sR relies on the expected realized spread
in Eq. (12) rather than the conditional realized spread per observation. If
λ differs in the time before and after the MiFID II implementation, the two
methods do not yield the same result.
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Ness et al. (2001) state that the adverse selection mea-
sures of Madhavan et al. (1997) and Glosten and Harris
(1988) are related to volatility and the share of informed
traders at the market, but not correlated with other adverse
selection measures. Both models focus on the information
content of the order flow while for instance neglecting the
information revealed by the open limit order book. The
Glosten and Harris (1988) idea of higher trade volume re-
vealing private information is not supported by the results for
the Cboe sample. The distribution of the volume-dependent
parameter in Figure 24 in the appendix suggests that most
stocks display a negative volume-dependent effect, though
there is no clear direction of the effect for all stocks. This re-
sult can partly be attributed to the use of algorithms or order
types such as iceberg orders that can split up large orders to
reduce price impacts. The negative effect could be caused by
uninformed traders who are required to move large volumes
to meet their required portfolio composition or risk tolerance
level without having the time or the resources to minimize
price impacts. Moreover, the impact of aggregating trade
volume on the measured effect (see Section 3.2) is hard to
assess as it might depend on individual stock characteristics
such as trading activity, price and / or volatility. The Madha-
van et al. (1997) assumption of a positive serial correlation
of the order flow holds for the Cboe sample. Although the as-
sumed quote revision due to surprise in order flow ρˆx seems
low with 0.03 cents before and 0.07 cents after MiFID II for
x 6= 0, Section 4.1 provides an indication of the downwards-
biased autocorrelation. Furthermore, the ability to estimate
adverse selection with serially correlated trade indicators is
an advantage compared to the Glosten and Harris (1988)
model. Hence, the Madhavan et al. (1997) results might be
more appropriate as an adverse selection measure for the
Cboe sample than the Glosten and Harris (1988) results.
The discrepancies in model implied spreads and observed
spreads shown in Section 4.2 are a sign of poor model per-
formance. However, the high share of quote observations
affected by aggregation increases uncertainty of the quoted
observed spread and the midquote which is used to deter-
mine the observed effective spread. Although the transac-
tions used for the model estimation are signed by using quote
data, the sign rule in Section 3.2 declares uncertain trades
as inside the spread. Even if the trade aggregation process
weakens the estimated effect size of serial correlation and
trade volume, the models still incorporate the basic Huang
and Stoll (1997) idea that order flow is informative. As a
consequence, the model implied spreads based on transac-
tion data might be more suitable to determine the prevailing
spread at the time of the transaction than the aggregated ob-
served spreads. Additionally, implied and observed effective
spreads are similar and the assumed MiFID II change is pos-
itive for both.
The Madhavan et al. (1997) model parameter θˆ1 of
0.3021 cents implies 0.31 cents higher effective spreads and
approximately 0.18 cents higher realized spreads in January
2018 than in December 2017. For the six months estimation
period, θˆ1 with 0.4385 cents implies 0.51 cents higher effec-
tive and approximately 0.27 cents higher realized spreads for
January to March 2018 than for October to December 2017.
The direction of the measured effect is not as expected for the
MiFID II regulations, which are supposed to increase mar-
ket transparency and therefore reduce the adverse selection
component of transaction cost.
Indeed, it cannot be followed that the measured change
in adverse selection is attributable to the implementation of
MiFID II on January 3rd, 2018. Other events in the estimation
time frame after January 3rd might have also caused adverse
selection to rise. To further evaluate this, the Madhavan et al.
(1997) and Glosten and Harris (1988) extended models are
estimated for event dates from November 2017 to February
2018 with a rolling estimation window of two months. The
event date is the date for the activation of the additional ad-
verse selection parameter/s.
Figures 1, 2 and 17 to 26 in the appendix show the rolling
parameter estimates for both models. The mean rolling pa-
rameter estimate for the additional adverse selection param-
eter θ1 in Figure 1 rises from 0.0 cents in mid-November to
0.3 cents for the last days of December and the first days
of January. After that, θˆ1 steadily decreases to 0.1 cents at
the start of February, then drops down to -0.1 cents. The
adverse selection parameter for the whole estimation time
frame θˆ0 in Figure 2 remains about constant for November
and December. Logically, it increases from the start of Jan-
uary 2018 to mid-February from 0.32 cents to 0.8 cents be-
cause the dropped out additional parameter θ1 has to be ex-
plained by θ0 before the event. Figures 21 and 22 in the ap-
pendix show a similar relationship for the constant adverse
selection parameters zˆ0,1 and zˆ0,0 for the Glosten and Harris
(1988) model. The volume-dependent additional parameter
zˆ1,1 gradually increases from mid-December with -0.1 cents
per 10000 shares to 0.0 cents at the year change to a high of
over 0.1 cents in the last third of January and falls down to
-0.1 cents afterwards.
On the one hand, the peak of the additional adverse se-
lection parameters at the turn of the year provides evidence
for a relevant change in adverse selection during that time.
Positive falling parameters for the month of January imply
the interpretation of long-term effects rather than additional
events. Although many events at the start of January 2018
possibly impact information asymmetries for stocks, MiFID
II fundamentally changes transparency and functionality of
financial markets as a whole. Therefore, MiFID II is presum-
ably the main event impacting changes in information asym-
metry.
On the other hand, if only the MiFID II implementation
influenced adverse selection at that time, the rise of the addi-
tional adverse selection effect would start in early December,
not in mid-November. This observation could be explained by
early adaptations of market participants to the regulations.
Seasonality or other unrelated changes in volatility of newly
available public information, share of informed traders and
trading activity are likely to impact adverse selection. For
instance, the approaching release of annual financial state-
ments and new strategic announcements are plausible rea-
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Figure 1: Rolling parameter estimate θˆ1
Note. This figure plots the mean estimated Madhavan et al. (1997) parameter θˆ1 for event dates from November to February with a two months estimation
time frame. Starting from the event date, the additional adverse selection parameter is active. The vertical line displays the MiFID II implementation date.
Figure 2: Rolling parameter estimate θˆ0
Note. This figure plots the mean estimated Madhavan et al. (1997) parameter θˆ0 for event dates from November to February with a two months estimation
time frame. Starting from the event date, the additional adverse selection parameter is active. The vertical line displays the MiFID II implementation date.
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sons for increased information asymmetry at the start of the
year. The length of the estimation time frame does not allow
to detect and control for these patterns. Additionally, effects
of most regulations are unlikely to show immediately at the
implementation date.27 The drop of the additional adverse
selection parameter θˆ1 shown in Figure 1 at the start of Febru-
ary could be a long-term event effect. In the case of MiFID II,
published transparency data was incomplete at first as not all
market participants were prepared to fulfill the reporting re-
quirements. For example the Double Volume Cap publication
on dark pool trading volumes was delayed to March 7th by
the European Securities and Markets Authority due to insuf-
ficient quality of the collected data (see European Securities
and Market Authority, 2019). Also, adverse selection effects
could persist longer than the actual information asymmetry
since market participants cannot instantly incorporate newly
available information into their trading behavior.
Collectively, despite evidence for higher adverse selection
right after the MiFID II implementation, a reduction of ad-
verse selection due to MiFID II in the long-run is more plau-
sible than an immediate effect and cannot be rejected by the
empirical results.
6. Conclusion
I evaluate the impact of the Markets in Financial In-
struments Directive II (MiFID II) regulation on information
asymmetries. The microstructure models of Madhavan et al.
(1997) and Glosten and Harris (1988) are extended to mea-
sure the additional adverse selection effect after the MiFID
II implementation date. A sample of 50 German equities
traded at the Cboe European Equities exchange is used to
estimate the models.
While the MiFID II transparency rules are expected to
reduce information asymmetries, the results show more ad-
verse selection after the regulation came into force on Jan-
uary 3rd, 2018. Estimated effective spreads are 0.31 cents
higher in January 2018 than in December 2017. Rolling
model estimation indicates a possible long-term reduction in
adverse selection. I discuss the attribution of the adverse se-
lection changes to MiFID II.
Further investigation of MiFID II effects could use meth-
ods to identify Granger causal effects of the MiFID II imple-
mentation. Additionally, a larger estimation time frame and
increase in sample size could be valuable to detect more re-
silient long-run effects on adverse selection. Similarly, the
change in inventory holding and direct transaction cost may
be evaluated. Potential stock characteristics that determine
the size of the estimated effects could be identified. Further-
more, the proposed extended microstructure models allow to
27 The tick size band introduced by MiFID II is an exception because it was
implemented at January 3rd and directly impacted the price formation pro-
cess. The increasing sample mean transitory parameters φ and c0 until the
end of January imply higher inventory holding and direct transaction costs
(see Figures 17 and 25 in the appendix). This is consistent with the increased
minimum tick size for the majority of stocks at the MiFID II implementation
date, which is included in the transitory parameter.
examine effects of other events impacting information asym-
metries on financial markets.
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